Fitz Patrick (USA)

Map of Fitz Patrick

Map Loading...

BWR 820 MW constructed by General Electric; grid connection in 1975

Facilities in Fitz Patrick

plantreactor typconstruction startoperation startshut down

Deisgn errrors in the HPCI and RCIC suction line isolation valves could prevent the valves from shutting if the piping ruptured.


Containment high radiation monitors contained an extra circuit of unknown origin that could have caused the monitors to indicate nonconservatively low. cond. existed since initial operation


Design deficiency in ESW system return line routing could result in a loss of all EDGS or inadequate cooling to RHR heat exchangers. cond. existed since intitial operation


Design errors in the LPCI and core spray systems caused the injection valve on one train to hydraulically lock, could occure on all trains.


Piping design error for RHR vent: found to be susceptible to overloading under certain conditions, failure of this piping could result in loss of primary containment integrity.


Shutdown because of failure of the RHR isolation valves. Leaked at a rate of 20.000 liters per minute (valve flow, when its fully open is 34.000). Backup valve prevented any water from actually escaping.


Unmonitored radiation release through auxilary boiler atmospheric vent (in startup mode). Leak of steam-heated waste water concentrator was discoverd after several hours when a plant workers shoes triggered a radiation monitor, 4 other workers required decontamination. For several hours the vented steam contained cesium, cobalt and other radionuclides, which settled on the roofs and walls of adjacent buildings. Then it rained. About 23.000 liters of contaminated runoff water was flushed from buildings into Lake Ontario. NRC had warned since 1975 several times because of the potential pathway. The concentration of radioactive material released exceeded by 65 times the maximum permissible. NRC proposed a fine of US$ 137,500 against utility.


Many check valves in the emergency service water were inoperable because of accumulations of silt and corrosion products.


A MFW malfunction resulted in turbine trip reator scram; a lock washer was lodged in the amplifier box causing a path to ground. HPCI and RCIC initiated and injected on the low reactor level; HPCI experienced flow fluctuations and had to be controlled manually


HPCI: turbine stop valve opened too slowly during test; filter elements and hydraulic oil control system were clogged wih foreign material


Area coolers required for ECCS operability inoperable because of silt impeding cooling water flow.


Excessive leakage of primary containment penetration.


6 emerg. cooling water check valves were inoperable because of mud and scale accumulation.