Dampierre (France)

Map of Dampierre

Map Loading...

4 * 900 MW PWR units constructed by Framatome;operation started in 1980/81

Facilities in Dampierre

plantreactor typconstruction startoperation startshut down
Dampierre-1PWR19751980
Dampierre-2PWR19751980
Dampierre-3PWR19751981
Dampierre-4PWR19751981
2008-12-27

Due to an maintenance operation, Dampierre-3 underrun the limit for the water temperature of the primary circuit.

1998-05-30

French nuclear regulatory agency (DSIN) has asked EDF to seek alternatives to massive chlorination of liquid effluents to kill dangerous amoebae that have been found to proliferate in rivers downstream of some of the utility´s nuclear plants.
The problem cropped up first in 1996 at Dampierre.
EDF chose to equip Golfech, Chooz and Civaux, with steel-tubed condensers to avoid the copper and zinc pollution that occurred with the brass-tubed.
A coalition of consumer advocate and environmental groups contended in a report that the situation around the new plant at Civaux could be worse than at Dampierre, because the plant effluent could raise the temperature of te Vienne River by 2° C (versus 1 °C at Dampierre on the Loire) and because the Vienne´s flow rate sometimes is only 1/10 that of the Loire. Chlorination of the Vienne is limited due to the risk of forming carcinogenic residues, they noted. They said several communities depend on the Vienne for drinking water and there are places for leisure and tourist activities downstream of the plant.

1994-08-11

Iodine 131 was released from a SG, into the reactor building. This caused contamination of 62 workers during maintenance. The contamination levels were below 1/30 of annual limit according to the management. The incident was caused by a pocket of iodine in the SG U-tubes. The containment ventilation system was not working and allowed the iodine to accumulate near the workers and the plant radiation monitoring system was not working !! - The corresponding electric cabinet was in service at the same time!
After cleaning the air the work could be continued. EdF acknowledges iodine contamination is becoming more frequent, with 2 important incidents in 1993 at Bugey and Dampierre and another at Penly in spring 94.
the incident was indirectly caused by the ban of the use of midloop operation in which SG are totally drained and the primary piping is drained to appr. half levelectrical midloop operation has caused an incident at Bugey-5 in Feb.

1992-09-20

Leak of about 350 liters/hour on piping connecting the safety injecftion system to the RCS, due to a crack in a weld. Leak stopped when pressure was lowered and the leaked water was recovered in containment sump

1992-07-22

Incident during verification of reactor vessel head closure: Two workers were irradiated, one of them received a dose of about 50 mrem, dose of the other was below this limit.

1992-03-30

Corrosion at the bottom of containment liners found throughwall at some places during inspections.

1992-01-22

Both iodine filters of the control room ventilation system were blocked by blind flanges that had been placed on the circuits for a test at the end of December1991. It was only after checks following another maintenance action that the operating crew noticed lack of pressure in the filter circuits. The consequence in case of an acccident would have been a reduction of oxygen in the control room. Common mode failure of both trains of the system.

1992-01-01

Circumferential cracks were found on the outer diameter of several tubes beyond the sludge zone in 1 SG. Inspection turned up a slight irregularity in the form of tubesheet holes.

1990-08-17

Unit was in cold shutdown for repairs, when RCS cooling was interrupted for 5 minutes. it occured after the level of coolant fell unexpectedly, necessitating stopping of the RHR pump. Pump was put back in service after coolant had been raised by injection of water from another system.

1989-10-13

Excessively rapid rise to power as it was coming out of a planned outage.

1989-08-01

Two plugs on the hydrogen recombiner /trapping system were discovered. Plugs had been left in place by mistake after a test in Dez.1988. Unit had operated with an important safety system disabled for over 6 months.

1989-03-29

SG plug was leaking during pressure tests, had cracks on its outside surface.

1988-12-24

Faulty establishing of circuits led to a transfer of water from the spent fuel cooling pool to the borated water tank, which overflowed. 30 cubic meter were collected in the tanks oveflow bowl.