Brunswick (USA)

Map of Brunswick

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2 * 800 MW BWR units constructed by GE; operation started in 1975/76

Facilities in Brunswick

plantreactor typconstruction startoperation startshut down
Brunswick-1BWR19691976
Brunswick-2BWR19691975
1993-07-01

During inspections core shroud cracks were discovered . The most significant is a circumferential crack located in a weld in the heat-affected zone of the core shroud's top guide support plate (depth about 19 mm) - possible movement of the shroud during a DBA could hamper control rod insertion!! - 3 minor cracks were obsrved earlier in 1993 in the core shroud at unit 2.

1992-04-04

Structural deficiencies in safety related walls in the EDG, control and reactor buildings were identified. Wall failure could cause a loss of safety related equipment in these areas. Deficient bolts were installed in seismic walls and missile shields in the building housing the EDGS.

1992-04-04

Structural deficiencies in safety related walls in the EDG, control and reactor buildings were identified, wall failure could cause a loss of safety related equipment in these areas; Deficient bolts were installed in seismic walls and missile shields in the building housing the EDGS.

1990-11-23

HPCI had to be isolated due to a failed fuse and relay.

1990-10-07

All 4 EDGs inoperable due to inadequate SW flow; Unit-1 SW header secured for refuelling outage, 1 of the 2 unit-2 SW pumps failed to start due to a failed relay.

1990-05-18

All 4 crews and 8 of 27 licensed operators failed requalification examen. Unit shut down for outage; Operators will receive additional training.

1990-05-18

All 4 crews and 8 of 27 licensed operators failed requalification examen. Unit shut down for outage; operators will receive additional training

1990-05-14

HPCI failure when control power was lost to the minimum flow bypass valve to the suppression pool. Faulty light bulb caused a control power fuse to blow.

1990-03-02

HPCI system was rendered inoperable to isolate a steam leak located on the steam supply drain line. Inboard and outboard steam supply isolation valves had to be shut. Severe steam erosion caused the failure of a carbon steel pipe elbow.

1989-06-17

Loss of offsite power for approx. 10 hours. All safety systems functioned properly. NRC considered the incident significant, because its a precursor to a station black out, which NRC has idenified as a main contributor to the risk of core melt. Unit-2 was at 100% power when control room received a ground fault alarm because of stray electrical currents caused by moisture in ductwork protecting electrical cables. Operators initiated a gradual power decrease. A repair crew accidentally removed a protection device, resulting in a strong electrical surge., -> water heated up, vaporizing and rupturing the dutchwork, a second short resulted in the start-up transformers automatically tripping. Loss of startup auxiliary transformer lead to both RC pumps tripping. At that point the unit entered an unstable area of power. To prevent core oscillations operators manually scrammed the unit. (Oscillations occured also in La-Salle-2)

1989-02-21

HPCI system: cracks discovered in 2 steam supply piping supports.

1988-12-14

Failure of LPCI system due to erosion of isolation valve internals.

1988-12-01

Cracks attributed to intergranular stress corrosion cracking were found in welds of 7 reactor vessel jet pump inlet nozzles and 2 core spray inlet nozzles during routine ultrasonic testing. cracks ranged from 71% to 37% through wall.; on all jet pump inlet nozzles the cracks propagated into the low-alloy steel of he reactor vessel (propagation of cracks into the reactor vessel had been seen only once before, at Taiwan Power Co's Chinshan!)

1988-07-05

Potential common mode failure of multiple HPCI & RCIC DC motor operated valves. Unit was shut down for repairs after repetitive failures of motor operated valves

1988-03-19

Control rod drive line leaks

1988-03-02

Fatigue crack failures of 2 trains of the diesel generator building fans

1988-02-19

Electrical switchgear, motor control centers and panel boards fabricted with silicon bronce carriage bolts that were over torqued and subject to IGSCC.

1988-02-01

Crack in a recirculation piping riser safe and nozzle weld propagated into the nozzles low-alloy steel.

1988-01-02

Containment isolation valves in 2 drain transfer lines failed to close. This 4 containment isolation valves did not close on an actuation signal. This represented a failure of both redundant safety divisions of the containment isolation system.