Turkey Point (USA)

Map of Turkey Point

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2 * 700 MW PWR units; constructed by Westinghouse; grid connection in 1972/73.

Facilities in Turkey Point

plantreactor typconstruction startoperation startshut down
Turkey Point-3PWR19671972
Turkey Point-4PWR19671973
1998-09-01

FP&L has a desire to extend the license of its twin-unit Turkey Point plant another 20 years.
Turkey Point-3´s license expires in 2012 and unit 4´s in 2013. The SGs in both units were replaced in 1982-83, respectively.

1990-10-18

Inadequate containment cooling may exist during a DBA. During operations of the CCW system, a postulated loss of offsite power with a single EDG failure could result in less than 2 emerg. containment coolers being available. Condition existed for an undetermined period of time.

1990-10-18

inadequate containment cooling may exist during a DBA, during operations of the CCW system, a postulated loss of offsite power with a single EDG failure could result in less than 2 emerg. containment coolers being available, condition existed for an undetermined period of time.

1990-06-27

RCS relief valves: PORV block valves may not fully close under maximum diff. pressure conditions. The torque switch settings were too low - manufacturer's values unconservative.

1990-01-12

The contents of one radiation monitor tank were released to the environment without properly monitoring the effluent activity, lasted for 46 min. Process radiation monitor failed.

1989-09-15

Manual scram involving multiple equipment failures (including failure of the rod control system, several valves) one SG experienced some overfeed-> rapid RCS cooldown.

1989-01-16

Leaks in three reactor core thimble guide tubes.

1988-10-01

Mechanical seal leak on a RHR pump.

1986-12-27

On 27 December 1986, the control room operators at the Turkey Point Unit 3
pressurized water reactor in Florida City, Florida manually shut down the reactor after
a malfunction in the turbine control system caused an unplanned, undesired rapid
power increase. The condition should have caused an automatic shut down of the
reactor, but there was a failure in the reactor protection circuit that forced the operators
to respond. Shortly after the reactor shut down, the pressure in the reactor coolant
system increased. A power-operated relief valve opened to limit the pressure increase
by discharging some water from the system. The power-operated relief valve
successfully curbed the pressure rise, but it failed to re-close when pressure dropped.
Reactor cooling water poured out through the stuck open power-operated relief valve,
as it had done during the March 1979 reactor meltdown at Three Mile Island. Unlike at
Three Mile Island, the operators at Turkey Point Unit 3 recognized the problem and
promptly closed a second valve downstream of the stuck open valve to terminate the
loss of coolant accident. The combination of the reactor’s failure to automatically shut
down when conditions warranted it and an equipment failure causing a loss of coolant
accident were key factors in the NRC calculating the severe core damage risk from
this event to be 1 x 10-3 or 0.1% per reactor year. The event was not rated on the INES
scale.
(source: Residual risk)