River Bend (USA)

Map of River Bend

Map Loading...

930 MW BWR constructed by General Electric; grid connection in 1985.

Facilities in River Bend

plantreactor typconstruction startoperation startshut down
River Bend-1BWR19771985

Workers found 760 items in the River Bend suppression pool, but the company says there was no danger that the pool's emergency cooling water strainers could have become clogged.
In light of concerns about the risk of BWR emergency core cooling system (ECCS) suction strainer clogging, Henderson said the NRC requires utilities to keep a log of items known to have dropped into plant suppression pools. Prior to River Bend's sixth refueling outage, the utility's log listed only 37 items as having dropped into the pool since 1992. The outage at the 991-MW BWR began January 6 and ended February 13. The utility said the suppression pool was cleaned following the fifth refueling outage.
Among the items found in the suppression pool were small items such as: tape, nuts, washers, bolts, thermoluminescent dosimeters, pens, welding rods, medium-sized items such as: sheets of paper, pieces of cloth, rolls of tape, and scaffold knuckles; and large items such as: plastic bags, a 12-inch by 16-inch by 1/4-inch rubber mat, a scaffold board, an 8-foot piece of scaffold, and a 1-foot by 4-foot piece of plywood.


Scram caused by spurious signal because of process noise. For the first 5 minutes the scram seemed to be routine, but then it appeared that the main generator and the turbine had failed to trip - which operators did manually. Main generator trip led to an electrical anomaly which resulted in loss of FW and condensate system and isolation of the main steam system. 500 hours repairs: a leaking fuel rod was removed and a valve repaired.
In the middle of the series of failures a malfunctioning governor valve was involved, which implicated in the failure of RCIC. Malfunction was caused by corrosion.
Similar problems with governor valves stem binding causing overspeed turbine trips have surfaced during tests at North Anna-2, Surry-1,-2 und ANO
[The turbine driven pumps are parts of engineered safety features designed for RHR or for providing redundant means for water supply to the vessel or the SG.] The defective components were replacements of the original.


Shut-down for repair of a cracked feedwater nozzle. The crack was first detected in 1989 during refueling outage and has been inspected frequently. The crack increased in depth and length: last recorded depth was about 9 mm and it exceeded 200 mm around the 300 mm diameter pipe.Failure of the pipe could led to a LOCA. Repair will cost about US$ 10 million


Unexpected voltage rise led to start up of a standby emergency diesel, of the reactor core isolation cooling initiation logic and two low pressure ECCS valves opening.


Second instance of multiple MSIV failures occured after corrective action being taken. MSIV solenoid valves failed to release.


Leak in the hydraulic turbine control system and turbine vibrations -> trip, when unit should be reconnected to the grid after 101 day refueling outage.


Freeze plug in service water pipe failed causing flooding and loss of power to RHR, spent fuel pool and other equipment.


Numerous air leaks in the feedwater regulating valve operator caused sluggish response. MFW fed cold water causing a reactivity addition, resulting in scram.


Cat crawled on grounding transformer causing short -> scram.


Plant trip on generator brush failure with failure of VAC and back leakage through injection and check valves.