Quad Cities (USA)

Map of Quad Cities

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2 * 800 MW BWR constructed by General Electric; grid connection in 1972.

Facilities in Quad Cities

plantreactor typconstruction startoperation startshut down
Quad Cities-1BWR19671972
Quad Cities-2BWR19671972
1998-07-01

Quad Cities-1 was forced shut 88 hours when a level control valve began to cycle erratically, causing a hydraulic transient in which three pipe supports were broken and insulation was shaken off of the piping to the moisture separator drain tank.

1997-04-01

Quad Cities shows high fire probability; actions studied:
Redundant trains of electrical cables may have to be separated ultimately at Quad Cities-1 and -2 to lower the quantitative probability of core damage accidents resulting from fire at the station.
The lack of separation between certain sets of redundant cables near the Turbine building is believed partly responsible for the high core damage frequency (CDF) number spit out by the plant's Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE).
Quad Cities´IPEEE showed a CDF of 5 x 10-3 per reactor-year from internal fires; NCR's safety goal is to keep core damage risk from all sources below 10-4. The high CDF has prompted a great deal of concern by NRC.

1995-08-04

Unit was brought down in March for outage which included modificatuions of FW regulating system, upgrades to the main turbine and installation of a core shroud modification designed by GE. The core shroud repair added two weeks to the outage: four tie rods were installed as a fix to prevent potential seperation of the shroud in the event of a circumferential crack. But reinstalling of the main steam seperator required unplanned modifications.
Operator hasn't been able to get the unit to full power since it came out of refueling outage August 4. Restart was delayed by a string of troubles: trip during turbine testing, turbine oil leak, repair of a FW regulation valve;

1994-04-27

Inspection revealed cracks in the core shroud as at Dresden-3, but cracks are smaller ( < 20 mm).

1993-06-09

A steam exhaust line burst as workers were performing routine testing on HPI system. 5 workers were burned by steam, 3 received "minor" radiation exposure.

1992-04-02

Loss of off-site power for 345 minutes and loss of shutdown cooling for 2 hours and 20 min. due to malfunction of a sprinkler system that caused a transformer trip. Coolant temperature increased only slightly from 55 to 60°C because unit was on 93th day of refueling outage.

1991-08-17

low pressure core spray: check valves in the pump rooms' drain systems failed leak testing, could allow flooding of the rooms

1991-08-13

Plant shutdown after discovering that the standby gas treatment system was unable to maintain adequate negative pressure in the secondary containment. A leak in the reactor building roof was the cause.

1991-08-13

Plant shutdown after discovering that the standby gas treatment system was unable to maintain adequate negative pressure in the secondary containment. A leak in the reactor building roof was the cause.

1990-11-15

Drywell airlock and feedwater check valves were leaking.

1990-10-31

Core spray and RCIC were delared inoperable when water was found backing up into the room through a floor drain. Malfunctioning check valves along with the sumps being out of service was the cause.

1990-09-15

HPCI system: the gland seal condenser hotwell pump began to cycle when a level switch failed. Operation without the pump would release steam into the HPCI room and cause a HPCI isolation on high room temperature.

1990-08-11

HPCI steam exhaust check valve failed, a downstream stop check valve was shut to isolate the leakage. This rendered the HPCI system inoperable.

1990-07-07

Floor drain check valves in all ECCS rooms inoperable, would allow flood water to all redundant ECCS equipment rooms.

1990-07-07

Floor drain check valves in all ECCS rooms inoperable, would allow flood water to all redundant ECCS equipment rooms.

1990-04-01

Cracks found in the stainless steel liner on the inside of the reactor head. 2 of the 23 cracks could be as deep as 12 mm thick, which would penetrate the vessel material as well; 1 crack is 750 mm long. The cracks are no immediate safety concern, but could get a significant problem, if they get larger. Analyses of the worst case conditions showed that "the cracks would not propagate to a depth to affect the reactor vessel before its next refueling outage in 18 month." ( Standards require a minimum of 80 mm thickness fo the RPV. Plant has a greater than 102 mm-thick vesselectrical ) - 19 GE-BWRs might be vulnerable to cracking in reactor vessel heads (14 in USA,). The problem is probably not generic but linked to a specific manufacturing process. The only other plant that so far has had similar problems was Millstone-point-1 in the mid. 1970s

1990-03-13

RCIC steam inlet valve failed open using the local and remote control switches during a test.

1989-04-17

During testing a relief valve failed to close. Operators manually scrammed the reactor, cooldown rate exceeded the limit of 40°C during the first 2 hours of the blowdown.

1988-03-20

Packing leak on FRV caused turbine trip due to leakage shorting two busses. MSIV closure.