Point Beach (USA)

Map of Point Beach

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2 * 500 MW and 2 * 520 MW PWR units; constructed by Westinghouse; grid connection1970/72 and 1973/74.

Facilities in Point Beach

plantreactor typconstruction startoperation startshut down
Point Beach-1PWR19671970
Point Beach-2PWR19681972
1995-12-03

Wisconsin Electric Power Co.'s (Wepco) Point Beach-2 will operate at 90% power for the cycle that began December 3 because so many of the unit's steam generator tubes are now plugged or sleeved. The restriction will continue until the steam generators can be replaced next fall, given regulatory approvals.
Each of Point Beach-2's two steam generators has 3,260 tubes. The A steam generator has an equivalent plugging rate of 25.6% with 777 tubes plugged and 1,145 tubes sleeved, and the B steam generator has an equivalent plugging rate of 19%, with 529 tubes plugged and 1,263 tubes sleeved. The composite plugging rate for the unit is 22%.

1995-07-20

Unit operating at reduced power because of SG tbe problems. 17% of the tubes in the 2 SG are already plugged ore sleeved and therefore working with reduced flow rates. 25% effective plugged tubes is the license limit. SG exchange is planned for July 1996. The two new Westinghouse SG are 70% complete.
SG degradation is caused by water chemistry conditions in the early 70s.

1991-09-29

Both MSIVs failed to fully close from the control room during a plant shutdown. The valves required mechanical assistance (a hammer) to completely close due to corrosion. MSIVs have failed to close at least 16 times since 1974. This valves are typically closed only during shutdown, but might be required to close in seconds under accident conditions.

1990-10-12

A cable separation problem was found which could cause overloading and failure of the EDGS, condition existed since construction.

1990-08-29

RHR pumps cannot provide adequate flow to the containment spray pumps when the ECCS is in the recirculation mode. Condition existed since initial operation

1990-08-29

RHR pumps cannot provide adequate flow to the containment spray pumps when the ECCS is in the recirculation mode. Condition existed since initial operation.

1990-07-12

Original LOCA analysis error discovered: Underestimation of the decay heat power fraction indicated a potential for exceeding the 1200°C peak cladding temperature.

1990-07-11

Original LOCA analysis error discovered: Underestimation of the decay heat power fraction indicated a potential for exceeding the 1200 °C peak cladding temperature.

1990-04-09

It was determined hat the EDGs may not operate for longer than two hours following a seismic event, because the fuel oil piping between the EDGS and the emergency oil tank was not seismically qualified and may not replenish the day tank.

1990-04-04

1.) A potential single failure of safeguards bus breaker could result in paralleling both EDGs out of phase. This could result in failure of both EDGs and a loss of onsite AC power. 2.) It was determined hat the EDGs may not operate for longer than two hours following a seismic event, because the fuel oil piping between the EDGs and the emergency oil tank was not seismically qualified and may not replenish the day tank.

1988-08-12

Design error: Containment design pressure could be exceeded in a postulated main steam line break accident assuming a single failure of the main feedwater regulating valve to shut.