Philippsburg (Germany)

Map of Philippsburg

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Unit-1: BWR 900 MW constructed by KWU started operation in 1979.
Unit-2: PWR 1300 MW constructed by KWU started operation in 1984

Facilities in Philippsburg

plantreactor typconstruction startoperation startshut down

Leakage between containment and liner over a instrumentation lead


Leagage from the containment over a pressure balance conduit of the personnel air lock


Since the midth of 2004 it is known that an incident with loss of coolent could eventually not be mastered. Therefore the German Ministry for the Environment has urged the Energie Baden-Württemberg (EnBW) to implement the necessary measures.
Because of its technical weak spots Philippsburg was investigated by the IAEA in October 2004. According to the IAEA the plant is in good shape.


In 2004 in Philippsburg-1 eight events rated INES 0 occured according to the BfS annual report.


In 2004 in Philippsburg-1 four events rated INES 0 occured according to the BfS annual report.


Malfunction of the emergency diesel generators.


Radioactive contaminated water was accidentially released into the Rhine when an unplanned use of the outdoor switchyard of the emergency shutdown system occured. This event was rated INES 1.


Deviances in the specifications of the fixations of motors and pumps were found in the emergency cooling system, the aftercooler system, the closed cooling water system and service water system. This event was rated INES 1.


In 2003 eight events rated INES 0 occured according to the BfS annual report.


In 2003 four events rated INES 0 occured according to the BfS annual report.


An incident in the main steam system was more severe than assumed first. Therefore it had to be re-labelled as INES 1 instead of INES 0.


A faulty wiring of two main steam measuring devices was caused by disregard of instructions and rated INES 1.


Cleaning paper was found in the emergency shutdown system and in the control rod drive system at Philippsburg-1. The paper was used by a cleaning firm in May 2002. After the paper was found the whole system had to be cleaned. This event was rated INES 1.


At a safety-relevant important ventilation system the socalled rupture disk had been installed the wrong way for many years. The installation error was noticed during the yearly revision in the block 2 rather coincidentally.


In unit-1 an error at the water chamber of a steam condenser was discovered. An emptying connecting piece was leaky from an unsettled cause. As a precaution all emptying and ventilation duct were exchanged. Another error was found at this reactor on the same day: The switching mechanism of the emergency power system did not function correctly. Workers stated that when switching self-supply to foreign supply one of six emergency power lines was without tension.

Unit-2 of the atomic power plant is taken off from the grid due to a breakdown in the safety system. The staff at the plant noted on 25 August in Unit-2 that one of the four accumulator tank airs did not show the compulsory boron acid concentration. Two days later, the operators established the same fault in two more tanks. Yet, only on 28 August was the compulsory concentration achieved again in all four containers. The accumulator tanks are necessary for fill up the reactor's primary cooling circuit in the case of a leakage. This is a essential condition for the proper functioning of this safety feature. In addition, the flooding tanks had contained significantly less water than they were supposed to, this situation had repeatedly occured over 17 years. Operator EnBW had at all time acted consciously and had neither sought to remedy the situation, nor inform regulators. The Federal Ministry of Environment gives permission for the restarting of the Unit-2 in the atomic power plant Philippsburg on 14 December 2001, after the following conclusions were drawn from the breakdowns: The director/conductor of the Unit-2 as well as the responsible person shift leader were relieved by their functions. Technical measures which were transferred include above all, that it is prevented in future that pure water can be fed into the accumulator tanks. Beyond that a starting check list, which contains all necessary measures, procedural instructions and system-oriented prerequisites for the restarting, was created. Likewise improvements were made at the water and boric acid management. With these and a series of further measures comparable occurrences are to be excluded in the future. The operator of the NPP is obligated to revise its safety management on the basis of comprehensible objective safety indicators within 6 months. Additionally a deepened organisation check is to be executed by the responsible national Department of the Environment. Also deficits of the other regulatory authorities and the TÜV were determined. The BMU requested the responsible Department of the Environment to quit the expert contract with the TÜV. According to the final report of the Department of the Environment of 18 January 2002 a personnel bottleneck led to omission, without it the heavy safety breakdown could have been prevented. The operator of the reactor, the Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg (EnBW), wants to supplement the personnel in Philippsburg with around 18 new places within the technical area.

After a scram external fresh steam isolation valves closed outomatically, but then fast-opened by mistake - because the valve motion had caused improper seating


Small emission of noble gases via the reactor stack released by a leaking fuel element during monitoring fuel integrity.


During restart a pressure relief valve opened by mistake and remained open. Valve was tested on next day, and failed open again. Cause was found to be a pilot valve which failed to operate correctly because of foreign matter.