Mochovce (Slovakia)

Map of Mochovce

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2* 440 MW PWR reactors are in operation. Mochovce reactors are Generation II Soviet type reactors i.e. VVER 440/213

Also a LILW storage is in operation in Mochovce (RÚ RAO). It is a surface-type disposal site designed for ultimate storage of solid and compacted radioactive wastes. A total capacity of 7.200 containers offer an aggregate capacity of about 22.320 m3. A licence was awarded in 2000 to run active tests for a one-year period. Successful tests were evaluated and the repository is now under permanent active operation.

Facilities in Mochovce

plantreactor typconstruction startoperation startshut down
Fire in Mochovce

On Nov. 29 2010 a fire broke out in reactor no. 2 of the NPP Mochovce. The Slovak nuclear regulatory body UJD announced that the incident happened in the turbine-generator in the non-nuclear part of the reactor. A leak in the oil pipe and a broken sensor were the cause of the problem.
No radioactivity was released.

Contracts signed for completion of Mochovce

"Contracts have been signed with the main suppliers for the project to complete units 3 and 4 at the Mochovce nuclear power plant in Slovakia.
On 11 June in Bratislava, in the presence of Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico, utility Slovenské Elektrárne (SE) signed the relevant contracts for the completion of the two units with the suppliers of the nuclear island: a consortium led by Skoda JS and including Russia's AtomStroyExport (ASE) and three Slovakian suppliers.

Contracts dealing with the engineering, construction and project management of the conventional island were signed with Italy's Enel Ingegneria & Innovazione.

Also present at the signing ceremony were representatives of Areva-Siemens, which will supply the instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, and Skoda Power, which will supply the steam turbines.

In May 2008, the consortium led by Skoda JS - which includes ASE and Slovak suppliers Výskumný Ústav Jadrovej Energetiky (VÚJE), Enseco and Inžinierske Stavby KoÅ¡ice - submitted a bid to the tender for completing the nuclear islands at units 3 and 4 of Mochovce.

Skoda JS, a subsidiary of Russia's OMZ Group, said that its contract to supply key systems for Mochovce units 3 and 4, worth more than $520 million, represents "a great success that underlines the leading position of the company among Czech suppliers of large investment units." It added, "Contraction of this project guarantees development and expansion in the field of nuclear power industry in future years. It will also enable raising up a new generation of specialists, who will subsequently apply their skills and knowledge within the planned construction of new units at Temelin, Bohunice and Dukovany."

In February 2007, SE announced that it would proceed with Mochovce 3 and 4 construction, and that Enel had agreed to invest €1.8 billion ($2.6 billion) on this with a view to operation in 2012-13. SE has already invested €576 million ($844 million) in the two units. The government is depending substantially on the original 1986 construction permit including environmental clearance, which is now being challenged, with the need for a full new environmental impact assessment under EU law being asserted.

Skoda JS said that work on the project would begin this month. Unit 3 is scheduled to be completed in February 2013 and unit 4 is set to be finished in October 2013. Once in operation, the four reactors at the Mochovce plant will supply some 45% of Slovakia's power demand."


The scoping phase of the environmental impact assesment (EIA) started.
The English document is available under:


SE / Enel has launched a tender for the construction of NPP Mochovce 3/4

The tender, concerning the refurbishment of the civil part of conventional sections of the nuclear power plant, was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 25 June 2008. SE - 66% owned by Italy's Enel - said that bidders should submit letters of interest by 18 September. The assumed deadline for submitting bids is 8 December.
The company said that construction work at the third and fourth units at Mochovce is scheduled to start on 1 April 2009. The reactors are expected to be completed by the end of June 2011.
Mochovce Units 1 and 2 have been significantly upgraded and the instrument and control systems replaced with assistance from western companies beforee operation started. Units 3 and 4 - also VVER-440/213 units - have remained partly built.

In January 2006, the Slovak government approved a new energy strategy incorporating these plans.
In February 2007, SE announced that it would proceed with Mochovce 3/4 construction, and that ENEL had agreed to invest Eur 1.8 billion on this with a view to operation in 2012-13. SE has already invested Eur 576 million in the two units.
The government is depending substantially on the original 1986 construction permit including environmental clearance, which is now being challenged, with the need for a full new environmental impact assessment under EU law being asserted.
In May 2008, a consortium led by Skoda JS and including Russia's AtomStroyExport (ASE) and three Slovakian suppliers submitted a bid to the tender for completing thenuclear islands at units 3 and 4 of Mochovce.
In mid 2008, the European Commission approved SE's plans for Mochovce 3/4 subject to the design being brought into line with existing best practice for resistance to aircraft impacts. It is not clear what this means, though the approval is simply to enable financing. The reactor's containment walls will be 1.5 metres thick and the plant shall be in compliance with safety requirements established in 2007 by the WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators Association) for existing reactors.

Success of NGO activities - no money for Mochovce

Today, the Dutch bank ING has withdrawn from financing the Mochovce 3,4
NPP in Slovakia. They will not invest anything into the project, but will
continue to invest in the Slovak utility SE.


In 2007 according to the annual report of the UJD, the nuclear regulatory authority of the Slowak Republic, two incidents at Mochovce 1/2 were categorized as INES 1.

Power uprate at Mochovce unit 1/2 - EIA started

Environmental Impact Assessment procedure started concerning EMO 1/2 power uprate.

SE/ ENEL plans a power uprate of unit 1 and 2: the thermal power of the reactors should be increased to 107%, which would result in an increase of 100 MW. To meet this target changes in the reactor core are necessary.

Construction plans for NPP Mochovce Units 3 and 4

Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant is located in the southern region of the Slovak Republic (Nitra County), between Levice and Nitra, 100 km from the capital Bratislava.

When grounding works launched at Mochovce site in 1981 as a preparation for the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant construction (EMO), step-by-step completion of all four planned reactor units was reckoned. In early 1990s, when the construction faced lack of funding for EMO construction, it was clear that the completion will split in two stages. In the first stage, all efforts focused on completion of the Units 1 and 2, which were commissioned in 1998 a 2000.

Construction works on the Units 3 and 4 have been halted in 1992, and since that time the attention was paid to implementation of preservation and protection works on components so that they be immediately ready for further works in case a decision was taken about the completion.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Riskaudit the project of the Mochovce NPP Units 1&2 has been assessed as meeting a safety level comparable with Western Europe standards. Therefore it has been selected as the „referential” one for the completion of the Units 3 and 4, too.

The final decision has been long-awaited. Progress has come up just after privatisation of SE, a.s. by the Italian utility Enel. According to Enel completion of Units 3/4 would ensure long-term energy independence for Slovakia.
Completion of the Mochovce NPP Units 3/4 - according to the Least-cost study developed by SE, a.s. - is economically the most beneficial option of ensuring electricity supplies to cover the demand in Slovakia in the future.

Construction chronology

1980 Site permit
1987 Building permit - start of construction
1992 Halt of construction works
1993 Start of preservation and protective works
2000 Approval of the Strategic plan of MO3/4 preservation, maintenance and protection
2002 Takeover of supplies to SE property
2007 Feasibility study development
2007 Final decision on completion
2008 Re-start of completion works
2012 Commissioning of the Unit 3
2013 Commissioning of the Unit 4


In 2005 according to the annual report of the UJD, the nuclear regulatory authority of the Slowak Republic, one incident at Mochovce 1/2 were categorized as INES 1.


In 2004 according to the annual report of the UJD, the nuclear regulatory authority of the Slowak Republic, one incident at Mochovce 1/2 were categorized as INES 1.


In 2003 in Mochovce-1 and 2 11 events labelled INES 0 and one event labelled INES 1 occured according to the UJB annual report.


In 2003 according to the annual report of the UJD, the nuclear regulatory authority of the Slowak Republic, one incident at Mochovce 1/2 were categorized as INES 1.


In 2002 in Mochovce-1 and 2 13 events labelled INES 0 and one event labelled INES 1 occured according to the UJB annual report.


In 2001 in Mochovce-1 and 2 12 events labelled INES 0 and 2 events labelled INES 1 occured according to the UJB annual report.


In 2000 in Mochovce-1 and 2 24 events labelled INES 0 and one event labelled INES 1 occured according to the UJB annual report.


In 1999 in Mochovce-1 and 2 14 events labelled INES 0 occured according to the UJB annual report.


In 1998 in Mochovce-1 and 2 30 events labelled INES 0 and 2 events labelled INES 1 occured according to the UJB annual report.


Slovenske elektrarne (SE) officially assumed responsibility for operation of Mohcovce-1 following 144 hours of full-power tests that were described as successful.
Mochovce-1 went critical in May, produced first electricity in July, and reached full power August 28. Plant director Jozef Valach said the unit will be in test operation for 10 to 12 months.

Connection to national grid

Slovakia´s Mochovce-1 was connected to the national grid July 4.The VVER-440 was operating at 20% power with one turbine, the second was scheduled to be switched on this week.

Slovaks and Austrians have been negotiating another international review under the auspices of the IAEA.

A six-month trial operation period is expected to begin in late August once initial testing has been completed.

Outside rewiew of the pre-operational safety report

Experts from Riskaudit will get to see the pre-operational safety report for Mochovce-1 at a meeting next week in Slovakia.
Slovak authorities, including top nuclear regulator Miroslav Lipar, said the pre-operational safety report (Posar), which belongs to SE and contains confidential information from Skoda might be provided for outside review, but not to the walkdown team leader, Wolfgang Kromp, whom they accused of violating a bilateral agreement not to copy the report and of general bad faith.
SE said the team from Riskaudit would have the Posar at their disposal. Their review is expected to cover accident analysis and safety measures.


Report of Walkdown II to Mochovce NPP

The INSTITUTE OF RISK RESEARCH of the Academic Senate of the University of Vienna published in July 1998 its Report to the Government of the Republic of Austria. The report contains the results of the second Walkdown of an international team of experts to NPP Mochovce Unit 1.

Comprehension of the most important topics the experts report
  • The Team's overall impression is that, within the scope of the areas reviewed, considerable progress has been made in many areas affecting the safety of the Mochovce NPP. SE, after a substantial hiatus, has undertaken a massive construction and reconstruction effort that was necessary to update the original Soviet design to the current plant. The conversion was largely successful. The effects of implementation of the Safety Improvement Program over the past three years were clearly evident in many aspects of the plant design and intended operational characteristics.
  • With two important exceptions (reactor vessel integrity and confinement, discussed below), the Team found that Mochovce can achieve a level of safety similar to pressurized water reactors licensed in western countries. This statement is contingent on the plant's successfully completing all of the activities now still underway or scheduled that are necessary to achieve the comparability with best practice.
  • The Team notes its disappointment that access to important safety-related information (particularly on the embrittlement/PTS issues, including the relevant sections of the POSAR) was denied by SE. The Team concludes that technical resolution of the embrittlement/PTS issue is an important matter which must be resolved in the near future.
  • At the time of the Walkdown, there was still a large amount of activity in progress, including construction completion activities on Unit 1 and implementation of the safety improvement program on Unit 2.
Bubbler Condenser

The information obtained led to the conclusion that the Bubbler Condenser and hermetic zone for Mochovce are among the best of the units with WWER-440/213 confinements. But a number of factors are still not fully investigated including:

  • dynamic loading of the gap-cap system by mass flow-induced differential pressures upon occurrence of a LOCA;
  • oscillatory loading of the flat water pool trays by condensation phenomena;
  • water carry over into air traps during the impulsive air transfer period;
  • possible limitations of the air flow from the Bubbler Condenser into the air traps in case of approaching sonic velocities inside the check valves;
  • efficiency of the Bubble Condenser tower in case of partial failure of the condensation trays or of single gap-cap systems (by-pass formation); and
  • water spilling over during passive spraying.

The limited level in which the mentioned above facts were investigated doesn't allow an explicit estimate of the behavior of the Bubbler Condenser in the case of the design basis accident
For the unambiguous evaluation of the efficiency and stability of Bubbler Condenser at the Mochovce NPP, and for all other NPPs of this type, it is necessary to conduct additional experimental and calculational research. It is necessary to accelerate construction of the new experimental apparatus in Russia and the Czech Republic and conduct full-scale investigations of the thermal-hydraulic efficiency and structural stability of the bubbler condenser and verification of the calculational codes.

Fire protection

A substantial improvement in fire safety design (as compared with the initial walkdown) was noted. Some of the most significant improvements are:

  • almost all fire barrier penetration deficiencies have been corrected;
  • a new fire detection system (with many more detectors than were utilized in the previous detection system) has been installed in critical safety-related plant areas;
  • the fire-resistant walls between the diesel generator rooms have been completed (with a 90-minute rating);
  • Deluge water fire protection systems were observed in all safety-related cable spreading areas. These deluge systems have a sufficient number of heads and branch lines to provide for area wide coverage. The deluge systems are all manually activated. Fire protection measures such as prompt fire brigade response (less than five minutes), low probability of fire (through transient combustible control), and flame-retardant cable coating provide for defense-in-depth. However, automatic actuation of the fixed deluge systems should be considered.

During construction, the new detection system has experienced (as to be expected) many false alarms, leading to a concern regarding inadvertent deluge system operation. After completion of construction activities, a cross-zoned automatically activated deluge system is recommended to provide for additional defense-in-depth.

Reactor vessel embrittlement
  • The change in the surveillance irradiation program must be part of the POSAR, this has not taken place yet. However, a concluding assessment regarding this matter will be possible only after a detailed analysis of the reports on the change in the surveillance test system and the availability of experimental results suitable for comparison.
  • It will also be necessary to verify that the surveillance samples are representative for the RPV materials, i.e. that the heat charge numbers, weld wire numbers and welding flux numbers of the samples and the RPV are identical.
  • This is the first time that thermal treatment is considered for recovery of radiation damage at least once during the expected design life already before this new power plant is put into operation. Should this be an unavoidable prerequisite for operation of this nuclear power plant for a reasonable service life, as was officially stated by Mr. Mikus, and the only method of guaranteeing its safety for the service life, this thermal annealing treatment must become an essential part of the preoperational safety assessment documentation (POSAR), and has to be included in all documents for licensing).
  • An in depth comparison of all available experimental Tk0 values is also urgently needed because determination of the allowable temperature-stress relations during transients and for the startup and shutdown processes depends on this comparison. Furthermore, the RPV material could reach critical ductile-brittle transition temperature properties much sooner. Therefore, a recommendation must be made that these results be analyzed thoroughly with the licensing authority and the POSAR be specifically updated in this matter before the unit is put into service, if possible, and by the end of the first campaign at the latest.

All options should be considered to plan and select the appropriate strategy to achieve service life of an RPV. Irradiation embrittlement management should be an essential part of Plant Life Management. With respect to PTS issues the use of an appropriate decision tool should be considered indispensable.
Modifications of fluid channels in order to help mixing of subcooled fluid and the loop water should be made where this mixing is uncertain. Raising the injection fluid temperature was adopted and is an essential step to improve the preconditions for proper function.

  • Uncertainties about the material properties and the radiation environment should be minimized. This applies for the RPV itself as well as for the precursory surveillance specimen and their positioning relative to the core Status and Prediction of the response to irradiation must be the result of the surveillance program prepared for the plant. The accurate test data acquisition and validation must be provided for with respect to chemical composition, grain size, microstructure, mechanical properties and their evolution in time as well as for flux spectra, fluence, irradiation temperature etc. for the base, the weld and the cladding materials.
Instrumentation and Control
  • The RCPS is a new system design and there is one area that was not reviewed by the walkdown team, and is worthy of evaluation. That concern is the susceptibility to electromagnetic fields (emf) and erroneous operation due to spurious or transient signals. In any system there may be sneak paths, ground loops and uncontrolled static that may only be accurately evaluated when the system is in actual operation together with all the other systems. In addition, lightning can be a serious initiator of such emf and its potential effects should be evaluated.
  • The new RCPS is of modern but non-conventional design. The total system is housed in a separate room near the control room and, at the time of the walkdown, was in the control of the Russian contractor. An FMEA has been performed on the design, but the reliability needs to be established. It would be desirable to monitor the reliability of the system components to establish the actual reliability of the system and use this information to determine the maintenance/spare parts requirements for this new system.
Safety Culture
  • The team noted evidence of significant progress in the practical implementation of safety culture principles at different levels of the NPP management. For example, important progress has been made in implementing the safety measures recommended by the IAEA, Riskaudit, and the Walkdown-I review performed in 1995. Also, SE-EMO has a well- substantiated program for safety program updating in the future. It includes diagnostic monitoring, maintenance and testing of equipment important for safety, monitoring of the environment, radiation protection and radwaste programs. It includes also a methodology for of feedback from external and internal events. An apparently open and, cooperative interface with UJD also seems to confirms an well-developed safety culture.
  • Although the Regulatory Team observed that the SE and EMO had implemented in many respects a comprehensive program on safety culture, with all the proper declarations, procedures, and mechanisms, the critical ingredient of success still remains the seriousness in dedication and determination in adhering to the principle and practices in safety culture at all levels of the organization. Two important indications of seriousness are the transparency of action/information, and a willingness to make corrective actions. To this end, the report notes with disappointment that one member of the Team has been denied access to important safety-related information, apparently because of administrative reasons. This incident has cast a disquieting shadow on the commitment of SE leadership to effective implementation of their safety culture goals.
Lightning protection and electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
  • The lightning protection system (LPS) has been designed and commissioned by an external company following the old Czechoslovakian National LP-Standard. The Czechoslovakian standard to which is referred above does not include the details on the protection against Lightning Electromagnetic Pulse (LEMP), nor does it include the use of electromagnetic zoning of the internal space which has to be protected. Zoning is needed to obtain the electromagnetic compatibility of different systems under lightning exposure of the plant.
  • The low voltage installations in structures are not provided with overvoltage protectors, surge arresters. When lightning strike to the wiring system of the external LPS the voltage between the structure interior metallic installations and the external LPS will generate unpredictable breakdowns with high risk for fire, short-circuit in power systems and failure in different power supplied electronic systems and high risk of electromagnetic interference in plant essential control systems.
  • Major part of the low voltage installations of the plant are of the Terra-Neutral-Common, TNC -type which cause that the operating current in the neutral conductor of the power system is spread all over the metallic systems of the structure and the plant. Essential part of a short circuit current or lightning current may flow in the metallic screen of sensitive cables and cause unacceptable interference.
  • The uncontrolled spread of impulsive operation currents, short-circuit currents and lightning currents in metallic constructions of the structures may through the resistive, inductive or capacitive coupling to the essential electronic systems influence their operation. There is a high risk of interference between the non-essential systems to the essential systems of the plant in all structures.
Seismic Analysis
  • It was reported that all safety related structures and equipment have been seismically requalified (based on the original Soviet design) by state-of-the-art seismic analysis (seismic input: 0.1g and NUREG/CR-0098 response spectrum). If required, structural upgrade measures have been designed. Most of them are now in place.
  • Because the steel construction of the bubbler-condenser is now connected to the structural walls in a better way and because the overturning potential has also been reduced, it is assumed that damage to the steel construction will be unlikely, not only due to hydrodynamic loads, but also due to seismic loads.
  • The seismic analyses and the construction drawings were provided on request and were spot-checked. Most of the seismic upgrades of structures were observed to have been completed.
Considering the safety relevance of a large earthquake, which potentially is a common cause of failure, the expert team deems that a new site-specific seismic hazard analysis should be completed as soon as possible assuming the necessary conservatism to account for the required low probability of occurrence of 10-4/year, which cannot be covered by the historical record.
External Hazards
  • Aircraft crash into critical plant structures is not judged to represent a significant contributor to core damage frequency for Mochovce. This conclusion takes no credit for a restricted airspace which will be established around the plant prior to operation.
  • External fire hazards are well controlled onsite. The site has largely been cleared of significant vegetation. The only apparently viable scenario involves a switchyard fire, with failure of diesel generators due to smoke ingestion.
  • The ECR contains controls for all three trains of high pressure injection (HPI), low pressure injection (LPI), reactor building sprays (RBS), and super emergency feedwater (SEFW). No controls are provided in the ECR for the purposes of draining the bubbler-condenser trays to the reactor building sump (visually verified and discussed with SE counterparts). The intention was to considerably reduce the necessity to perform this operation from the ECR by the safety improvement measure which connected the reactor coolant pump (RCP) compartment to the reactor building sumps, thereby permitting recirculation of primary coolant lost in the event of RCP seal failure.
  • There is a cable spreading room located under the emergency control room. Cabling for all three redundancies of safety systems (e.g., high pressure injection, low pressure injection, super emergency feedwater, etc.) are located in this cable spreading area. The outer wall of the transverse intermediate building at this elevation is penetrated by a number of unbarred, double-pane glass windows. These windows are not 90-minute rated fire barriers, which is inconsistent with my understanding of Slovak regulatory requirements. In fact, the windows have essentially no value as a fire barrier. Further, the windows contain nor are they protected by any visible security barrier which would act to delay or prevent entry via the windows by unauthorized persons. It is recommended that SE implement intruder barriers over these windows before commencing critical operations. The fire barrier deficiency should be corrected by the end of the first refueling outage.

You find the whole report (approx. 3 MB) at the website of the Institute of Risk Research.

Interantional experts commission in Mochovce

Fuel loading at Mochovce NPP started. First criticality and test operation is planned for May 25th.

Austria heavily opposes this decision because of several safety deficiencies. The Austrian government sponsored an international expert mission to the plant. A walkdown of the commission took place at Mochovce in the first week of May. The report of the 40 experts is expected in June. At the end of the commission's visit at the plant a press conference was held at Levice, organized by SE. Mochovce's General Manager T. Mikus declared that most of the working group leaders summarized positive impressions despite an agreement under which the results of the mission should not be published before the report would be ready and SE had a possibility to answer the findings. Because of this agreement the Austrian experts did not publish their findings until May 15th.

At this date they wrote a letter to the Austrian Chancellor Klima, to the Slovak president Meciar and to the responsible Slovak authorities. They warned to activate the core in Mochovce, because they suspected, that without mitigating measures the material properties of the reactor pressure vessel could lead to faster than expected embrittlement of the vessel (in particular of the circumferrential weld in the height of the active zone).

The expert commission asked for a delay of operation start and asked for more information concerning the reactor vessel and its properties.

The problem with the vessel was only one of many deficiencies discussed since 1994:

  • The bubbler tower: it is not proven that it can withstand the forces during a design basis accident. This should be examined by experiments carried out under the EC's PHARE program. These full size tests have been announced for 1997 during the Public Participation Process in 1994. In December 1997 contracts were signed with research institutions in Russia, Slovakia and Czechia. The tests will be finished probably in the year 2000 !!
  • Seismic qualification: a lot of buildings at the Mochovce site are not qualified to withstand an earthquake, an airplane crash or an explosion.
  • Safety Systems: the problems of spatial separation of redundant trains of safety systems are not completely solved.
  • The main steam lines, feedwater and emergency feedwater pipes inside of the intermediate building are not protected against pipe whip. This could result in simultaneous failure of more than one pipe.
  • Storage: A lot of components have been stored at the construction site during the long break, not all components were mothballed properly. At the first walkdown of an Austrian experts team in 1995 degradation was found at several locations. The qualification of these components and equipment is not completely proven. Not all necessary tests are provided.
Agreement of completion of units 1/2

SE signed agreements for completion of units 1/2: Main vendors are: Atomenergoexport, EDF, EZ Elektrosystemy(SK), Energoprojekt (CZ), Siemens, Framatome, Hydrostav (SK), VUJE (SK), Skoda Praha,
Credits are coming from a consortium of Slovakian banks 95 million $, Komercni banka /CZ 200 million $; Ceska sporitelna 100 million DM, the german Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau 130 million DM and Societe Generale 64 million DM; Russia agreed to contribute 150 million $.
In August 1996 construction work started again, with 1700 people at the site.

Meciar confirms the intention to close the early VVER-440 units by the end of the century

Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar has confirmed his country's intention to close the early VVER-440 units at Jaslovske Bohunice by the end of the century, provided the Mochovce nuclear plant is operating by then.
The previous week, during a visit to the Mochovce site northeast of Bratislava, Meciar has announced that the first of the two VVER-440 Model 213 reactors being completed there is expected to begin operation in June 1998 and the second a year later. He said the government also express to support completion of a second pair of VVER-440/213s at the site after 2000.

New design

Utility Slovenske Eletrarne (SE) and Russia's Atomenergoexport have negotiated cash terms for transferring to SE design information for the model V213 VVER-440 units at Mochovce, officials said last week.
The construction on the plant northeast of Bratislava will resume this spring, following settlement of a US$ 330-million loan between Czech banks and SE.
Sources said that the data transfer is a major component of a deal under which SE will pay Atomenergoexport about $18-million for its role in completing Mochovce.

Further cooperation

Electricite de France's (EDF) Centre Lyonnais de l'Ingenierie (CLI) and Slovak utility Slovenske Elektrarne (SE) were expecting to sign a contract this week for further cooperation in the Mochovce VVER completion project, following agreement November 15.
The agreement calls for EDF to help with project management, quality assurance, scheduling, cost assessment, and the modernization program planned for the Mochovce-1 and 2 VVER-440s. The two utilities also agreed that EDF's potential participation in implementing the project will be determined during the planning phase.
Lyon-based CLI, Construction Division, plans to send five people to Slovakia for four months. CLI earlier had about 40 people in Slovakia.
Now, SE is attempting to finish the two units with the original main contractor, Skoda Prague, and help from Russian organizations, with financing from Czech and Russian sources. Czech sources said the cost of finishing the plant under this plan is one-third cheaper than the EDF plan, not because the western companies had taken advantage of the project to "load" the modified design with items that had little to do with safety.
contract signed December 12.

Competences of the single organizations

Siemens and Framatome (= Eucom) will participate in completion of Mochovce-1 and -2, if the project goes ahead with Czech and Russian financing.
Energoprojekt Pague and Rusian institutions will be general project managers; Skoda Prague will supply 80-90% of components. Hydrostav Bratislava will carry out the construction and EZ Elektrosystemy Bratislava will do the electrical work. The western vendors will be responsible for the safety improvements an will supply the related equipment.
total costs for the project about 1000 million DM. Of that Skoda's work is estimated to 550 - 600 million $;

Cooperations and partners

Government decided to go ahead with the project with Skoda Praha as main contractor and guaranteed the necessary loans. EdF is also willing to participate provided the safety will be improved over the Soviet design.
Russian government has proposed a deal involving 150 million $ worth of credit with the concition that SE buys Russian made fuel for the units' lifetime.


Russian program for Mochovce completion, would only cost about 140 million US$ [EBRD project 950 million US$]

Later in March Meciar said Russia would provide only engineering documentation and possibly fuel. He said Slovakia had already invested 1100 million US$ in the project and needs another 630 million US$ for completion.